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Henry Mintzberg’s celebrated critique of the “design school” argued that strategy is best thought of as 
adaptive, bottom-up, and based on dispersed knowledge and learning. Yet Mintzberg’s account lacks a clear 
and comprehensive theoretical underpinning, especially regarding how to guide emergent strategy in 
dynamic environments, and leverage it to exploit value creation. We provide this foundation by showing how 
Mintzberg’s critique of planning and design at the level of organizational strategy is in key ways anticipated 
by F.A. Hayek’s critique of planning and design at the societal level. Both writers are critical of rationalist 
epistemology and instead stress experiential knowledge, fallibility, and unanticipated social consequences. 
Hayek also extends Mintzberg's work by showing how rules in the firm capture adaptive, experiential, tacit, 
and dispersed knowledge in the context of dynamic environments. A framework of rules thus creates 
inimitable and non-substitutable resources that enable the firm to fully exploit its competitive advantage. 
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Henry Mintzberg’s critique of the “design school” of strategic management represents a key 
moment in the modern history of the strategy field (Mintzberg, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1990). What 
Mintzberg took to be the dominant approach to strategic management—exemplified by leading 
scholars like Igor Ansoff, Ken Andrews, and Michael Porter—focused on the use of centralized and 
expert knowledge for formal strategic planning. In contrast, Mintzberg proposed a process approach 
to strategy that was adaptive, bottom-up, and based on dispersed knowledge and learning. In 
making his critique of rational design approaches to strategy, and outlining an alternative, 
Mintzberg not only caused controversy, but raised a series of fundamental questions—rooted in 
organizational theory rather than strategic management theory—about the foundations and 
fundamental assumptions of strategy research (Ansoff, 1991; Mintzberg, 1990, 1991; see also 
Tsoukas, 1993, 1996). These have not yet been satisfactorily resolved or the scope of their 
application sufficiently appreciated, even considering Mintzberg’s high standing in the strategic 
management community.1  
Mintzberg’s critique is based on a series of claims about the nature of organizations and 
managerial work (e.g., Mintzberg, 1973, 1979) that contrast with classic tenets of strategic 
management. Strategic management has, of course, moved dramatically beyond Ansoff and other 
early writers that Mintzberg criticized. Indeed, more recent developments like the knowledge-based 
and capabilities views of the firm (Bingham et al., 2007; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996), the  greater 
attention to middle-management strategic initiative (Glaser et al., 2016; Kanter, 1982; Wooldridge 
et al., 2008), the practice turn (Whittington, 1996), and the increased emphasis on adaptation in 
                                                          
1 Nerur et al. (2008, p. 319), following Ramos-Rodriguez and Ruiz-Navarro (2004), identify Mintzberg as one of the 
“authors who play a pivotal role in bridging two or more conceptual domains of research” in the intellectual history of 
strategic management. His work both in strategy and across disciplines also remains highly relevant: according to 
Google Scholar data, Mintzberg has been cited over 200,000 times, with 50,000 citations since 2015, reflecting his 
influence on a wide range of literatures. 





dynamic environments (Stieglitz et al., 2016; Teece et al, 1997) capture some key aspects of 
Mintzberg’s organization theory-based view of strategy, but not all. In particular, we do not have 
fully convincing answers to the following key challenge, implied by Mintzberg’s thinking: If firms 
need to make decisions that are adaptive relative to a changing environment and much of the 
decision-relevant knowledge in the firm is tacit and dispersed, how can firms best leverage that 
knowledge in the service of value-creation?  
To help address this challenge and subsequent gap, we reconsider Mintzberg’s critique in 
light of a parallel stream of research on organizations mainly associated with the Austrian 
economist, classical-liberal thinker, and Nobel Laureate Friedrich Hayek. Tsoukas (1996)—
observing similarities between Mintzberg and Hayek—showed the importance of Hayek’s work for 
strategy and organization scholars on “how to use widely dispersed knowledge and, therefore, how 
to extend the span of utilization of resources in a way that exceeds the span of control of any one 
mind.” In making a similar case, Foss and Klein (2014, p. 482) suggest that Hayek’s work has much 
to offer researchers in organization and strategy: 
A Hayekian research programme in organization studies would amount to examining 
dispersed knowledge in terms of providing precise conceptualization of the construct, 
linking it to decision-makers’ bounded rationalities, and exploring the implications for 
organizations and the management thereof of the combined effect of knowledge dispersal 
[authors: e.g., knowledge fragmentation and decentralization] and bounded rationality. 
 
Interestingly, some of the best-known challenges to the traditional view of managers’ epistemic 
capabilities have deployed versions of Hayek’s knowledge-based critique of planning (e.g., 
Brusoni, 2005; Foss & Klein, 2014; Grandori, 1997; Sharma, 1997). To take only two examples, 
Jensen and Meckling (1992) argued that decision rights are best left to the most knowledgeable 
employees, while Aghion and Tirole (1997) argue that the need for knowledge to be outsourced and 
dispersed “strains the use of managerial authority as a mechanism for coordination” as “knowledge 
dispersal transfers real authority” (Foss & Klein, 2014, p. 476). These works hinted at various ways 





that Hayek’s ideas can be applied in contemporary theory, and can even be foundational in 
management theory. 
As we will show, Hayek and Mintzberg’s research agendas examine the same core premises. 
Specifically, environments where dispersed and tacit knowledge, combined with the cognitive 
limitations of entrepreneurs. managers and planners, and dynamic internal and external 
environments, represent major challenges to planning and strategy-making.  
 
THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIETY—AND IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
For some time, strategy research (e.g., which generic strategy to pursue, how to defend a 
competitive position, how to protect competitive advantage, and so on) has focused on strategy 
content (Teece, 2020). In contrast, the strategy process through which organizations formulate the 
strategies that they may or may not follow has been explored less (Foss, Klein & McCaffrey, 2019, 
pp. 45-46; Rumelt et al., 1991; Varadarajan, 1999). In the 1960s and 1970s, strategic management 
came to be dominated by a rationalist planning and design ideal associated largely with the work of 
Igor Ansoff (1965; see also Moussetis, 2011), but also more broadly with the more prescriptive 
schools of thought in strategic management, and even more broadly with a widespread confidence 
in the ability to rationally plan human affairs. This line of research, which leaned heavily toward the 
“content” side of strategy, remains prevalent in strategic management despite the existence of 
various competing schools of thought.2 
                                                          
2 There has been much discussion of the classification of different approaches to strategic management (see Sarbah & 
Otu-Nyarko, 2014; Volberda & Elfring, 2001). Here, we rely primarily on Mintzberg’s (1990) distinction between 
prescriptive and descriptive schools of thought. This is partly for reasons of expediency, but also because Mintzberg’s 
critique—and Hayek’s insights—can contribute something to most if not all schools of thought, regardless of exactly 
how we classify them. At the risk of oversimplifying, some of the basic assumptions of the prescriptive approaches can 
be seen in the kinds of highly simplified diagnostic tools used in environmental analysis, e.g. SWOT, competitor 
analysis, e.g., the Five Forces Model (Porter, 2008), and other familiar tools of management teaching and research. 





These core tenets are parallel to, and perhaps even to some extent outgrowths of mainstream 
economic thinking of the 1950s and 60s (Rumelt et al., 1991). This thinking was informed by two 
historical circumstances. First, the period following the Second World War was characterized by a 
general optimism about economic planning, promoted mainly by the alleged successes of wartime 
economic planning and controls. These in turn were the direct result of the enormous expansion of 
economic research during the war, enabled by new methods of data gathering and analysis intended 
to put economists’ ideas to work in support of the belligerent nations. Planning in general became 
fashionable during the boom period of the “Thirty Glorious Years” until 1975 (Foreman-Peck, 
2014); in other words, at about the time the field of strategic management was in its infancy. 
Second, the research methods of the hard sciences heavily influenced economic research in 
the post-war period, and thereby imparted many assumptions to strategic management scholars. The 
(then) core of economic theory (general equilibrium theory) was transformed into a field of applied 
mathematics, and empirical economics became synonymous with econometrics, itself based on the 
methods of the natural sciences (Rumelt et al., 1991). It is worth noting that several major figures 
associated with the design school—and with current strategic management more broadly— such as 
Igor Ansoff, Kenneth Andrews, and Michael Porter came from professions outside management and 
that were sympathetic to the new economics (applied mathematics, statistics, and engineering, 
respectively). In light of these circumstances, it is not surprising to find that the ideal type of the 
strategic planner is a top decision-maker in possession of a clear and transparent corporate objective 
function. The strategist, armed with all relevant data, can work out the optimal course of action 
needed to guide the company through a future whose uncertainty is handled through scenario 
analysis and contingency planning (Foss, Klein & Bjørnskov 2019).  
Despite the success of rationalist, planning-oriented strategy thinking, subsequent work on 
organizations explicitly or implicitly challenged many of its central tenets. For example, population 





ecology research (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1984) challenged the assumption of a high degree of 
organizational flexibility inherent to rationalist strategy thinking, and culture research (Schein, 
1985) pointed to the limitations imposed by organizational belief systems. Organizational learning 
research (March, 1991) suggested that firms have a tendency to end up in suboptimal “competence 
traps”, and research on strategy as practice eschewed traditional models and recognized that these 
tools are only used in a modified, loose way by strategy practitioners (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009). 
Many of these critiques were developed from at least an implicit process perspective. Following 
H.A. Simon (1982), scholars acknowledge that bounded rationality (i.e., the limits of human 
decision-making in changing complex environments) “prevents any single individual from 
collecting and processing all the relevant knowledge necessary to make an optimal decision” (Sull, 
2005, p.93), and concur that strategy is actually the result of a process of dispersed actions and 
decisions rather than a well-thought out central plan (Mintzberg 1978; Mintzberg and McHugh 
1985). However, the questions of dispersed or tacit knowledge are not tackled upfront; the 
Simonian influence directs research more toward the cognitive and behavioural aspects of strategy 
praxis. 
Existing research that highlights dispersed knowledge neglects change (e.g., Grant, 1996; 
Hoopes & Postrel, 1999), or it highlights change, but mainly considers adaptation as resulting from 
the decisions of the top management team (e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Teece et al., 1997). 
This overlooks knowledge dispersed throughout the organization, as such knowledge often cannot 
be concentrated in the hands of top management, even taking into account such tools as enterprise 
planning systems, Business Process Improvement methods, knowledge management programs, 
balanced scorecards (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, pp.71,79), dashboards (Few, 2006, p.35), Executive 
Information Systems (Watson, Rainer, and Koh, 1991, p.22), and the like. The knowledge-based 
strategy literature acknowledges the importance of tacit knowledge as underpinning sustainable 





competitive advantage (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2001; Cavusgil et al., 2003; Spender, 1996). 
However, because this literature does not really deal with managerial decision-making, it stops 
short of explaining how this tacit knowledge is actually captured successfully in strategizing and 
adapting to dynamic environments and leveraged to create competitive advantage. More 
interestingly, Mintzberg does not offer such an explanation, either. 
However, a combined focus on strategy process and the challenges of dispersed and tacit 
knowledge is the direct implication of Mintzberg’s approach, and the complete challenge raised to 
the emphasis of the design school. Mintzberg’s understanding of the nature of knowledge in 
decision-making and how such knowledge is dispersed in an organization provides the initial 
insights into strategy processes by highlighting the difficulties of identifying and integrating such 
knowledge (Mintzberg, 1989, 1990). Thus, if we take learning and emergence seriously, we cannot 
help but look at process and change as well. 
Thus, while most strategy content research remains based, one way or the other, on timeless 
equilibrium models that do not explicitly treat process,3 strategy process research remains a 
relatively small area in strategic management (Foss, Klein & McCaffrey, 2019, pp. 45-46). This can 
be partly explained by the fact that, unlike strategy content, it lacks a clearly articulated economic 
foundation (Foss, 2007; Foss & Klein, 2014, p.479; Kogut & Zander, 1992).  
Hayek’s work can fill this gap by providing vital microfoundations for understanding the 
role of dispersed and tacit knowledge in a changing environment, and how can organisations best 
leverage that knowledge in the service of value-creation.4 Hayek (1937, p.49) defined the central 
problem of economics as the problem of the coordination of knowledge: 
                                                          
3 The capabilities view, which largely draws on evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece et al., 1997), is 
more explicit about process. 
4 While Simon acknowledged Hayek’s role in the development of the concept of bounded rationality (1969, p.34), their 
subsequent approaches differed: Simon focused more on the perspective of decentralized organizational planning, 
unlike Hayek’s emergent spontaneous order (Fiori, 2010, pp.154-55).  Mintzberg and colleagues have highlighted the 
limitations of Simon’s perspective, which “remained true to the broader but no less conventional notion of what might 





“how the spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each possessing only bits of 
knowledge, brings about a state of affairs in which prices correspond to costs, etc., and 
which could be brought about by deliberate direction only by somebody who possessed 
the combined knowledge of all those individuals.” 
Furthermore, his program in political economy arose in similar historical circumstances to 
Mintzberg’s critique, namely  as part of a larger mission to review “unrealistic and untenable 
assumptions that are made about the cognitive powers of decision-makers” (Foss & Klein, 2014, p. 
467). Hayek was aware, very early on, that the fundamental tools of economic analysis (e.g., 
general equilibrium models) could not address this knowledge problem satisfactorily, because 
“in our analysis, instead of showing what bits of information the different persons must 
possess in order to bring about that result, we fall in effect back on the assumption that 
everybody knows everything and so evade any real solution of the problem” (Hayek, 1937, 
p.49).  
Hayek work on the use of knowledge in society was inspired by the mid-twentieth century debate 
over the feasibility of socialist central planning (see, e.g., Hoff, 1949; Lange & Taylor, 1938; Mises, 
1990 [1920]). This controversy mainly revolved around the question of how centrally-planned 
economies would function without private ownership of capital goods and without a functioning 
price system that entrepreneurs could use to allocate them (Mises, 1990 [1920], pp.17-23; 1951 
[1922], pp. 131-135;  1998 [1949], pp.201-232). Hayek’s entry into the debate shifted the 
discussion toward emphasizing the dispersion of knowledge in an economy and how it affects the 
planning process and associated decision-making of economic actors (Hayek, 1948a, 1948b, 
1948c). According to Hayek, planning “will in some measure have to be based on knowledge 
which, in the first instance, is not given to the planner but to somebody else, which somehow will 
have to be conveyed to the planner” (Hayek, 1945, p. 520).  Hayek (1948c, p.155) further argued 
that, 
                                                          
be labelled cerebral rationality, that decision making is a cognitive process that can be decomposed into a sequence of 
simple, programmed steps” (Langley et al., 1995, p.262). 





“Much of the knowledge that is actually utilized is by no means ‘in existence’ in this 
ready-made form. Most of it consists in a technique of thought which enables the 
individual engineer to find new solutions rapidly as soon as he is confronted with new 
constellations of circumstances. To assume the practicability of these mathematical 
solutions, we should have to assume that the concentration of knowledge at the central 
authority would also include a capacity to discover any improvement of detail of this sort.” 
 This problem provided the core of his critique of centrally planned economies; according to Oğuz 
(2010, p.146), Hayek “made tacit knowledge a key part of his work on spontaneous order and 
evolution. The impossibility of conveying tacit knowledge of market participants to a higher 
authority became central to his defense of decentralization and free market.”  
Second, the core theme that developed in Hayek’s social philosophy addresses the 
simultaneous challenges of making best use of dispersed knowledge while adapting to unforeseen 
changes (Hayek, 1945, 1978, 1982). For Hayek (1978, p.182), the market is a learning process of 
trial and error in which “practically every individual has some advantage over all others in that he 
possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but… only if the decisions 
depending on it are left to him or are made with his active cooperation” (Hayek, 1945, pp.521-22). 
Thus, economic competition is “a capacity to find out particular circumstances, which becomes 
effective only if possessors of this knowledge are informed by the market which kinds of things or 
services are wanted, and how urgently they are wanted.” Hayek (1982, p.17) thus saw a relationship 
between dispersed and tacit knowledge, practical learning, and the evolution of market orders and 
organizations (Oğuz, 2010, p.158) in which “what is the best way of utilizing knowledge initially 
dispersed among all the people” is the central problem of any efficient economic organization 
(Hayek, 1945, p.520).  
Nonetheless, rather than searching for answers in other disciplines, Hayek (1937, p.52) 
contended that economic microfoundations are indispensable:  
economics has come nearer than any other social science to an answer to that central 
question of all social sciences, how the combination of fragments of knowledge existing 
in different minds can bring about results which, if they were to be brought about 
deliberately, would require a knowledge on the part of the directing mind which no 





single person can possess. To show that in this sense the spontaneous actions of 
individuals will under conditions which we can define bring about a distribution of 
resources which can be understood as if it were made according to a single plan, 
although nobody has planned it, seems to me indeed an answer to the problem which 
has sometimes been metaphorically described as that of the "social mind" (Hayek, 1937, 
p.52). 
His further contributions to the economics of knowledge are positive descriptions of the market 
economy and its organizations as much as they are criticisms of central planning, and as such they 
have value beyond their original context. In particular, if we consider strategy as a higher-level 
problem analogous to the production of capital goods by individual firms, Hayek’s ideas are 
relevant for managerial and entrepreneurial decision-making in an organizational context. Hayek’s 
key challenge can be summarized in his own words: “we can show in imagination what would 
happen if all these data were given to us. But we often forget that these data… are not available to 
any single mind, and, therefore, do not really lead to an explanation of the process we observe” 
(Hayek, 1983, p.36; emphasis added). 
 We elaborate on this below. Mintzberg’s arguments appear distinctly Hayekian, stressing 
the same issues, sometimes even using the same language5, and his criticism of strategic planning in 
firms parallels Hayek’s critique of central planning in the overall economy.6 Like Mintzberg, Hayek 
highlights the fleeting, subjective, tacit, and dispersed nature of knowledge as a potential source of 
advantage, and pits this insight against the notion of an ideal central planner, whether in society or a 
business organisation. Even though Mintzberg was not consciously influenced by Hayek, Hayek 
can be used to expand on Mintzberg’s positive approach to strategy and organization, as well as his 
                                                          
5 For example, Hayek (1945) speaks of bringing knowledge under the “control of any one mind,” while Mintzberg 
(1990) discusses the challenge of strategy being “controlled in one mind.” Mintzberg also mentions several times the 
difficulty of relevant knowledge being “comprehended in one brain,” etc. 
6 More recently Mintzberg (2015, pp. 4-5) has dismissed Hayek as a proponent of a narrow, mechanical, and self-
interested orthodoxy in economics. We believe this opinion to be quite incorrect, given Hayek’s critiques of rationalism 
and mainstream economics, emphasis on rule-based action, and general emphasis on cultural evolution (see also 
Tsoukas, 1996). In any case, Mintzberg’s critique of Hayek has no bearing on the similarities we discuss in this paper. 





critique. In this sense, Hayek might even be considered a foundational thinker for management 
theory. 
 
ECONOMIC PLANNING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING  
The strategic problem and the economic problem 
Ansoff (1965, pp. 118-121) defined strategy as a rational plan “for making decisions 
determined by product/market scope, growth vector, competitive advantage and synergy.” 
Mintzberg (1979, p.25) agreed, suggesting that “strategy is a mediating force between the 
organisation and its environment: consistent patterns in streams of organizational decisions to deal 
with the environment.” Scholars before (Chandler, 1986 [1962]; Drucker, 2018) as well as after 
(Porter, 1996) their debate have presented similar definitions. The key theme connecting all of these 
is the idea that strategy is a higher order framework essential to the formation of coherent 
competitive positioning on the market, generating a product portfolio, and executing an efficient 
production process. Strategic planning also implies decision-making to address these problems, as 
well as bearing responsibility for creating this higher-level framework. 
This common understanding of strategic planning is congruent with Hayek’s definition of 
economic planning in general, which he defines as “the complex of interrelated decisions about the 
allocation of available resources” (Hayek, 1945, p.520). The difference between the two views is 
therefore mainly one of scale: while Hayek referred to the “economic problem” as concerning the 
optimal production structure and allocation of scarce resources throughout society, Mintzberg’s 
critique of the prescriptive schools of strategy concerned the design of strategic frameworks and 
allocation of resources within an organisation. For both authors, therefore, the problem is one of 
understanding what are the best means for rational organization—at the level of economies and 





companies, respectively. And for both, this in turn is “a problem of the utilization of knowledge not 
given to anyone in its totality” (Hayek 1945, p.520). 
The parallels between Mintzberg’s and Hayek’s thought become apparent when Mintzberg 
identifies the conditions under which an organization “tilts” toward the design school model of 
strategy-making (Mintzberg, 1990). He highlights four such conditions—remarkably, roughly the 
same ones Hayek identifies as underlying comprehensive socialist planning (Hayek 1948b, pp.122-
124; 1948d, pp.181-182; 1994). For example, Mintzberg’s argument that the relevant knowledge 
cannot be established and set in stone before a new strategy has to be implemented—in other words, 
that the environment cannot be considered predictable—mirrors Hayek’s (1948d) point that 
dynamic conditions make centralizing knowledge even more challenging than it is under static 
conditions.7 Mintzberg, however, seems to be unaware of these parallels and there is no mention of 
Hayek in his article. To draw out the comparison, therefore, we will now examine their individual 
views more closely. 
  We consider four claims that, according to Mintzberg (1990), distinguish the design school 
model from his own view of strategy.8 He contends that each claim often proves false, both 
descriptively and prescriptively. Each theme in Mintzberg’s critique is also mirrored in Hayek’s 
works on knowledge, competition, and production. And like Hayek (1945), Mintzberg strongly 
stressed the distinction between practical, explicit knowledge and the fleeting, subjective, and often 
tacit knowledge acquired through learning by engaging with the environment (Mintzberg, 1990, 
p.182).9 
                                                          
7 Equally, Mintzberg’s view that strategic planning only works if the organization is prepared to cope with a centrally 
articulated strategy (Mintzberg, 1990, p.191) refers to implementation problems of the mechanism design variety that 
have also been highlighted as a challenge to centralized resource allocation (Maskin, 2015). 
8 Mintzberg argues that his critique also applies to other “prescriptive schools of planning and positioning” that “have 
accepted the most basic” assumptions of the design school (Mintzberg 1990, p.181; see also Mintzberg, 1989). 
9 Mintzberg (1990, p.182) argues that “Our critique of the design school revolves around one central theme: its 
promotion of thought independent of action, strategy formation above all as a process of conception, rather than as one 
of learning.” 





Thinking vs. learning. First, strategic planning, like economic planning, takes place under 
uncertainty and requires forecasts of the uncertain future (Foss & Klein 2012, pp.70-71, 180-181; 
Knight, 1921, pp.90, 201-203). Both the central planner and the strategist operate in an economic 
environment where the future is uncertain, in which economic data and coordinates change all the 
time. For Mintzberg (1990, p.185), “[d]espite implications to the contrary, the external environment 
is not some kind of pear to be plucked from the tree of external appraisal, but a major and 
sometimes unpredictable force to be reckoned with.” Mintzberg’s work on the “structure of 
unstructured decisions” (Mintzberg et al., 1976, p.246) focuses on decisions for which “no 
predetermined and explicit set of ordered responses exist in the organization.” Strategic choices 
exemplify such decisions, as they respond to major non-routine problems that have to be diagnosed, 
framed, and understood before appropriate responses can be devised. For Hayek, entrepreneurs 
constantly face an uncertain future that requires present decisions about how to invest and build 
capital goods (2009 [1941], pp.330-332), and “the amount of capital available at any moment in a 
dynamic society depends… on the amount of foresight which has been shown by entrepreneurs” 
(Hayek 2009 [1941], p.331). Therefore, the stock and continued employment of capital goods in the 
pursuit of profit—in society in general, and in an individual organization—depends crucially on 
“how correctly the entrepreneurs foresee what the situation will be at that future moment”, and thus 
entrepreneurial anticipations and interpretations of the external environment are, as for Mintzberg, 
“quite as important a datum” (Hayek, 2009 [1941], p.331) as physical resources. 
For the prescriptive schools of management thought, complexity and uncertainty suggest the 
need for and inevitability of strategic planning as well as the concentration of planning. According 
to Mintzberg, they view strategy “as [a problem] of design to achieve an essential fit between 
external threat and opportunity and internal distinctive competence” (Mintzberg 1990, p.171). 
Thinking of strategy this way is reminiscent of what Hayek (1982) called “constructivist 





rationalism,” that is, the notion that only institutions that can have their relevant premises 
understood to substantiate a rational syllogism can be justified. It is also easy to see how this vision 
resembles the ideal of resource allocation under central planning so strongly criticized by Hayek: 
both view planning as a mechanical or technological process of gathering and analysing data in 
order to generate a fit between either the internal and external environment (strategic planning) or 
the inputs and outputs of a production function (economic planning) (e.g., Hayek, 1948b, pp. 122-
124, 1948d, pp. 181-182). 
For both Mintzberg and Hayek the trouble with this view is that it overlooks the crucial 
problem of learning. As Mintzberg (1990, p.190) explains, “strategy formation must above all 
emphasize learning, notably in circumstances of considerable uncertainty and unpredictability, or 
ones of complexity in which much power over strategy-making has to be granted to a variety of 
actors deep inside the organization.” Similarly, for Hayek, 
There would be no difficulty about efficient control or planning were conditions so simple 
that a single person or board could effectively survey all the facts. But as the factors which 
have to be taken into account become numerous and complex, no one centre can keep 
track of them. The constantly changing conditions of demand and supply of different 
commodities can never be fully known or quickly enough disseminated by any one centre.” 
(Hayek, 2005[1945], p.59) 
 
The data that are needed to develop a complete plan cannot be made instantaneously or costlessly 
available to a strategist: they can only be learned through experience and trial and error. In a sense, 
the data do not even exist “out there” waiting to be discovered, but in fact are created through action 
in the marketplace. Therefore, even thorough deliberation will not be enough to formulate an 
adequate strategic plan, as the raw material (the knowledge) required for deliberation is not 
available to any one mind. Put another way, decision-makers cannot simply know the strengths and 
weaknesses of the firm without first testing them in the marketplace (Mintzberg 1990, p.182). In 
dynamic environments, finding a way to make use of knowledge and in turn learning from it 
requires some type of decision framework, which we identify below as rules. 





Concentration vs. dispersion. Second, in a complex and uncertain environment both 
strategic and central planning require the possession of a wide range of information and knowledge. 
The type, quality, and details of this knowledge are of primary importance. However, because of the 
limitations of human learning and the existence of uncertainty, relevant knowledge is dispersed 
among different actors and is not available to any one person in its totality. For Mintzberg, it is 
unlikely that the strategist’s “brain has full, detailed, intimate knowledge of the situation in 
question,” and furthermore, “he or she can only know the organization by truly being in the 
organization. This precludes the image of the case study classroom, the detached CEO with a pithy 
report, the “quick-fix” consulting contract, the quarterly directors’ meeting, even the weekend 
retreat of executives” (Mintzberg, 1990, p.190). Although Mintzberg does consider circumstances 
in which this deeper knowledge of the firm can exist in one mind (e.g., a major organisational shift, 
or the creation of a new organisation, both of which would require a “greenfield” approach to 
strategy, a “period of reconception”), he nevertheless emphasizes the challenge to CEOs of creating 
those circumstances. 
Knowledge does not exist in a concentrated form in the possession of the central (strategic) 
planner (Hayek, 1945). Hayek observes that, “[t]he reason for this is that the “data” from which the 
economic calculus starts are never for the whole society “given” to a single mind which could work 
out the implications, and can never be so given” (1945, p.519). This view is based on his 
understanding of the “inarticulate knowledge” every individual possesses about the world (Oğuz, 
2010, p.155). Hayek argues that “we are not in fact able to state all the rules which govern our 
perceptions and actions ... [W]e always know not only more than we can deliberately state but also 
more than we can be aware of ... and that much that we successfully do, depends on presuppositions 
which are outside the range of what we can either state or reflect upon” (Hayek, 1967, pp.60–61). 





If we were to paraphrase Hayek and apply his reasoning in the context of Mintzberg’s 
critique of the design school we might say that: “the data from which strategic thinking and 
planning are supposed to start are never for the whole company given to a single mind which could 
work out the implications, and can never be so given.” Using the example of firms’ cost curves, 
Hayek (1948d, p.196) argues that, 
[I]n the discussion of this sort of problem… the question is frequently treated as if the 
cost curves [of individual firms] were objectively given facts. What is forgotten is that 
the method which under given conditions is the cheapest is a thing which has to be 
discovered, and to be discovered anew, sometimes almost from day to day, by the 
entrepreneur, and that, in spite of the strong inducement, it is by no means regularly the 
established entrepreneur, the man in charge of the existing plant, who will discover what 
is the best method. The force which in a competitive society brings about the reduction 
of price to the lowest cost at which the quantity salable at that cost can be produced is the 
opportunity for anybody who knows a cheaper method to come in at his own risk and to 
attract customers by underbidding the other producers. 
 
In addition, not all knowledge exists in a form that can be communicated. Much of the relevant 
knowledge needed to craft a firm’s strategy, for instance, is tacit knowledge that cannot be 
consciously articulated, let alone plugged into a model of the external environment. According to 
Hayek, “so much knowledge of particular circumstances is unarticulated, and hardly even 
articulable (for example, an entrepreneur’s hunch that a new product might be successful) that it 
would prove impossible to make it public quite apart from considerations of motivation” (Hayek, 
1988, p.89).  
Hayek’s view actually pushes further than Mintzberg’s. Mintzberg allows for knowledge 
centralization in the context of “sufficient access to, and experience of, the organization and its 
situation to enable the strategist to understand in a deep sense what is going on,” or when a 
strategist has “developed a rich, intimate knowledge base over a substantial period of time” 
(Mintzberg, 1990, p.190; original emphasis). Yet for Hayek it is difficult for any entrepreneur or 
CEO to “know” the organization and the external environment enough to articulate a complete 
strategic plan at any point in time, regardless of whether strategy is considered during a period of 





operational stability or during a period of (re)conception. The crux of Hayek’s argument is that the 
strategist is never in possession of “objectively given facts,” not even when creating a new plan 
rather than modifying an existing plan. There is nothing to suggest, à la Mintzberg, that 
entrepreneurs or managers are more likely to articulate or communicate a vision or complete 
strategic plan during strategic reassessments, technological breakthroughs, or organizational 
creation than during the regular operation of the company. Again, this indicates that the need for 
some type of mechanism to effectively utilize knowledge in the firm is universal, and is not limited 
only to certain kinds of organizations. 
Formulation vs implementation. Furthermore, even assuming that full knowledge of past 
conditions could be obtained by a single planner or a small board (thus eschewing the problems of 
identifying, selecting, curating, and accurately conveying this information), this is not the same as 
knowledge of future conditions and changes (Mihelic & Siegrist, 2018), which require foresight to 
cope with. For Mintzberg (1990, p.182), “[e]very strategic change involves some new experience, a 
step into the unknown, the taking of some kind of risk. Therefore, no organization can ever be sure 
in advance whether an established competence will prove to be a strength or a weakness.” 
In his response to Mintzberg, Ansoff (1991, p.457) failed to address this Hayekian 
challenge, when he contrasts Mintzberg’s emergent, experimental strategy-making with the 
“rational model of learning.” According to Ansoff (1991, p.457), the “age of enlightenment ushered 
a new model which recognized importance of cognition in the affairs of man. In this model 
decision-making is the first stage, followed by implementation of the decision. It became the 
standard model of the natural sciences, and it was the model used in the early prescriptions for 
strategic planning.” 
 Hayek, in fact, can provide a strong foundational critique of Ansoff’s prescriptive view of 
planning outlined here. According to Hayek (1945, p.523), 





there are few points on which the assumptions made (usually only implicitly) by the 
“planners” differ from those of their opponents as much as with regard to the significance 
and frequency of changes which will make substantial alterations of production plans 
necessary. […] It is, perhaps, worth stressing that economic problems arise always and 
only in consequence of change. So long as things continue as before, or at least as they 
were expected to, there arise no new problems requiring a decision, no need to form a 
new plan. 
 
Hayek’s epistemological and methodological critique thus pushes Mintzberg’s arguments—which 
emphasize the practical problems facing managers—even further. Hayek (1945) shows that 
maintaining the continuous activity of the organization does not require a detailed plan followed by 
a thorough implementation, but “constant deliberate adjustments, by new dispositions made every 
day in the light of circumstances not known the day before, by B stepping in at once when A fails to 
deliver.” In other words, as Williamson (1996) has pointed out, a key concern in Hayek’s thinking 
is adaptation, specifically, with those institutions that are best capable of securing adaptation to 
unforeseen events in the face of dispersed knowledge. As Hayek (1945, p.82) notes, in the absence 
of unforeseen contingencies, the task of “drawing up a comprehensive plan governing all economic 
activity would be much less formidable,” as “economic problems arise always and only in 
consequence of change.” Because a comprehensive plan is impossible, managers will need to rely 
on a more adaptive framework. 
The kernel of Hayek’s challenge rests on the impossibility for the decision-maker to gather 
all the necessary knowledge before acting, that is, before implementation of the strategy, as Ansoff 
suggests. Hayek (1945) focuses therefore on the importance of organizationally embedded, tacit 
knowledge, which  
by its nature cannot enter into statistics and therefore cannot be conveyed to any [planner] 
in statistical form. The statistics which such a [planner] would have to use would have to 
be arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor differences between the things, by 
lumping together, as resources of one kind, items which differ as regards location, quality, 
and other particulars, in a way which may be very significant for the specific decision. 
 





These other particulars are embedded in habits, institutions, and practices, and therefore beyond 
what statistical data can capture, and—in a dynamic environment subject to change—beyond what 
can be profitably transformed into information (Oğuz, 2010, p.151) for centralized forecasts, 
including through Business Process Improvement methods, knowledge management programs, 
enterprise planning systems and so forth. According to Hayek (1948a, p.80), all individual 
economic actors perform “eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of circumstances 
of the fleeting moment not known to others”, both at a market and at an organizational level, and 
“any attempt to make them subject to [central] direction would necessarily mean that we restrict 
what social activity can achieve to the inferior of the individual” (Hayek, 1952, p.88). 
Hayek (1945, p.524; original emphasis) then concludes by highlighting that in this case, 
“planning based on statistical information by its nature cannot take direct account of these 
circumstances of time and place... the planner will have to find some way or other in which the 
decisions depending on them can be left to the man on the spot.” Once more, this means managers 
face the challenge of how to guide decisions and learn and adapt at the same time. 
Structure vs. strategy. The fourth and final major area of overlap between Mintzberg and 
Hayek involves the relationship between strategy and the structure of the organization. As 
Mintzberg argues, the design school approach holds that strategy must be fully formulated: only 
then can it be used to shape the structure and processes of an organization (1990, p. 179).10 In 
contrast, he observes that existing organizational structures heavily influence strategy formation 
(1990, p. 183). Strategists are constrained by a wide range of factors, including the current structure 
of a firm and the external and institutional environments: 
Structure may be malleable, but it cannot be altered at will just because a leader has 
conceived a new strategy… In effect, strategy and structure both support the organization. 
None takes precedence; each always precedes the other, and follows it, except when they 
                                                          
10 Mintzberg (1990, pp.179-180, p.183) does explain that design school writers do not rigidly adhere to this claim, as 
they recognize the practical importance of existing structures for strategy formulation. 





move together, as the organization jumps to a new position. Strategy formation is an 
integrated system, not an arbitrary sequence (Mintzberg 1990, p. 183). 
 
Hayek’s contribution to this discussion can be seen through his work on capital and business cycle 
theory. Here he stresses the importance of entrepreneurial forecasts in creating a “structure of 
production,” in this case, the firm’s unique combination of heterogeneous assets that it uses to 
create and sustain its competitive advantage (Foss et al., 2007; Hayek, 2008, pp.236-37; Hayek 
2009 [1941], pp.23, 37, 309-310). Capital goods have varying degrees of specificity and 
complementarity, and when assets are combined in production, they cannot be un-combined 
whenever a new strategy is formulated. Of course, entrepreneurs do their best to alter the structure 
of production in response to anticipated changes in the internal and external environment, but 
Hayek observes that this cannot be done instantaneously and without incurring costs. In fact, his 
business cycle theory stresses that entrepreneurs commit heterogeneous resources to production and 
that these assets cannot instantly and seamlessly be repurposed to meet changing conditions and 
demands for new strategies (e.g., Hayek, 2008). Hayek’s economic theory thus adds support to 
Mintzberg’s argument about structure and strategy by framing the relationship in terms of 
entrepreneurs’ use of capital assets. Utilizing these assets for value-creation, however, requires 
awareness of local and tacit knowledge. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY OF A COMBINED MINTZBERG-HAYEK VIEW  
The previous sections have shown several ways in which Mintzberg and Hayek’s views on 
organizations are similar and complementary. It remains to be fleshed out though how integrating 
their theories in this way helps to advance contemporary organization and strategy research.  
In this section we address this problem in two ways. First, we show how Hayek’s approach 
broadens Mintzberg’s own view, and explain how this synthesized view provides support for a 
theory of strategy-as-rules (as sketched by Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001) by looking at the process of 





integrating and coordinating dispersed knowledge in an organization in a dynamic context. Hayek’s 
implicit answer, we argue, is that emergent strategy can be fostered within a framework of rules, 
where the role of top management is not to formally plan or centralize strategic-decision making, 
but to create and discover guidelines that allow for the dispersed and tacit knowledge in the 
organization to be captured successfully, stored, and coordinated effectively in strategizing. Not 
only is this knowledge a source of inimitability for organisations through firm routines and 
capabilities, but rules themselves may be unique to individual firms and without strategic 
equivalents in rival firms. Emergent strategy fostered in a framework of rules can thus be used for 
value-creation in organizations. Hayek thus complements and extends Mintzberg’s approach, and 
helps to fulfil the promise of Mintzberg’s positive research program on the emergent properties of 
strategy process. 
Second, we explain how this modified strategy-as-rules framework sheds light on the 
process of how organizations shape strategy—relative to how strategy shapes organizations. That is, 
contrary to the emphasis on top manager-driven quick decision-making and reconfiguration based 
on rapid scanning of hyper-competitive environments that the dynamic capabilities view implies 
(Teece et al., 1997), we argue that a rules-based framework shows the value of strategies that 
evolve by aggregating the dispersed, tacit knowledge of the organization. The latter allow for 
organizations to shape strategy in two ways: both through providing a better understanding of the 
external environment where the firm operates (use of tacit knowledge), and by facilitating decision-
making under uncertainty for entrepreneurial managers (adaptation).  
How Hayek extends Mintzberg 
Mintzberg’s already influential critique of the rational planning ideal in strategy can be 
strengthened if reformulated along the lines provided by Hayek’s insights into the market 
coordination process. First, Hayek’s epistemological arguments provide a more fundamental 





critique of the rationalist assumptions of the design school. Second, strategy in any organization is a 
forward-looking process of what may be called “learning by implementation,” understanding that 
knowledge is dispersed among many strategic actors within the organization and that the existing 
structure of the firm influences the creation and implementation of strategy. Note that unlike 
Mintzberg, we refer to this process as applicable to all organizations, regardless of size or industry. 
This reformulation enriches and slightly corrects Mintzberg’s original discussion as follows.  
The irrelevance of firm size. In identifying the ‘niche’ of possible contexts in which the 
principles of the design school might apply, Mintzberg (1990, p.192) contrasts small entrepreneurial 
firms (Mintzberg 1979) with the “more complex types of organisation which depend on expertise 
for their functioning,” and which require learning, analysis, and intuition. Informed by this 
distinction between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial firms, Mintzberg argues that “the 
entrepreneurial mode of strategy making, where power is highly centralized in a flexible 
organization” (Mintzberg 1990, p.186; see also Mintzberg 1973), squares best with a design 
approach to strategy. However, this concession unnecessarily weakens Mintzberg’s argument by 
allowing a wider scope for strategy-as-planning than his core critique would otherwise indicate. The 
crucial point is that in this context the distinction between the two groups of firms, and between the 
different spheres of decision-making, is artificial. 
Small and “simple” organizations, as well as large, “complex” organizations, are both 
fundamentally entrepreneurial as far as resource allocation decisions are concerned. In both cases, 
entrepreneurship is an experimental process, biased and cognitively constrained, of combining 
heterogeneous resources and the services of resources in a context that is uncertain and 
characterized by asymmetric information. However, organizations that differ in size also likely 
differ in terms of organizational structure and control. All firms must also use good judgment to 





allocate resources, make strategic decisions, and create value.11 Equally then, within any 
organization, entrepreneurial judgment “centralizes” power over ultimate decisions about resource 
allocation, and crucially, this power exists in small and large firms. Within firm boundaries, 
however, further decision-making is decentralized and delegated to managers and employees, who 
act according to rules informed by the existing structure of the firm, and using the information 
embedded in the organisation as well as their own knowledge of the external environment. This is 
in fact the only way in which “entrepreneurial power,” insofar as it is required for coordination and 
decision-making, can be effectively yielded in both large and small organizations. As Hayek (1994, 
pp.159-162; 1973, p.51) points out, yielding power over other actors is implied in the process of 
planning, but the extent to which such power is used to fully centralize decision-making clashes 
with the dispersion of knowledge in economies and organizations, and inevitably leads to 
suppression of managerial initiative and to ineffectual results. 
Mintzberg’s views about this can be confusing. For example, in his discussion of the 
“entrepreneurial school” he states that centralizing strategic decisions in the CEO “can ensure that 
strategic response reflects full knowledge of the operations” (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel 
2009, pp.151, also 145-149), even in large companies. Yet his own arguments about learning make 
the opposite point: that large organizations especially are often hurt by basing strategy in the unique 
vision of a single entrepreneur. Furthermore, the presence of an entrepreneurial vision does not 
eliminate the need for learning. If anything, it often overlooks the fact that learning is exactly what 
entrepreneurs are doing when exploring their visions—as they bear uncertainty through decision-
making (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel 2009, p.152). If we recognize that knowledge can no 
                                                          
11 Chandler (1986 [1962], pp.11-12) explains that “[t]he executives who actually allocate available resources are then 
the key men in any enterprise... [E]ntrepreneurial decisions and actions will refer to those which affect the allocation or 
reallocation of resources for the enterprise as a whole, and operating decisions and actions will refer to those which are 
carried out by using the resources already allocated.… [W]herever entrepreneurs act like managers, wherever they 
concentrate on short-term actives to the exclusion or to the detriment of long-range planning appraisal, and 
coordination, they have failed to carry out effectively their role in the economy, as well as in their enterprise.” 





more be centralized or contained in one mind within an organization than it can be in a market 
economy, it becomes clear that the only effective organizational decision-making (in small and 
large firms alike) is at least partly decentralized and compatible with a learning-based, emergent, 
strategic process (Hayek, 1982, p.49).  
This reveals Mintzberg’s critique to be even stronger than he seems to believe: once the 
artificial distinction between small and large firms is removed, Mintzberg’s own thinking on 
organization and strategy has wider scope for application.  In Hayek’s terms once again, “Compared 
with... decentralization ... the method of central direction is incredibly clumsy, primitive, and 
limited in scope” (Hayek, 2005, p.59), regardless of the size of the organization, from small to large 
firms and to the economy as a whole. We could thus reformulate Mintzberg’s insight in Hayekian 
terms to conclude that in all organizations, compared with the method of centralized strategic 
planning, decentralization of strategy-making has the potential to be more agile, refined, and wider 
in scope. 
Guided evolution. This reformulation of Mintzberg’s original proposal brings us to the most 
important insight: this type of decentralized decision-making and learning through implementation 
must nevertheless be guided in some way. Neither Hayek nor Mintzberg do in fact dismiss planning 
altogether, that is, they do not dispense with systematic thinking in making competitive decisions 
within organisations. Rather, the emphasis in both their works is placed on deciding the proper 
context and scope for planning. But while Mintzberg’s discussion of this stops short of addressing 
each fundamental question, Hayek can help to flesh out the implications of Mintzberg’s proposal of 
emergent strategies.  
How do such strategies and strategic processes actually “emerge”? To paraphrase Hayek’s 
discussion of market coordination (1945, p.45), instead of choosing to “direct and organize all 
economic activities according to a “blueprint,” that is, “consciously direct the resources... to 





conform to the planners’ particular views,” successful strategic planning is about creating 
“conditions under which the knowledge and initiative of individuals are given the best scope so that 
they can plan most successfully.” Hayek shows that in the market, the price system provides the 
rules for coordination of production and exchange. And as we have shown above, uncertainty 
makes “mechanical,” “technological,” centralized strategic planning impracticable in organizations. 
What is required then, within an organization, is a substitute for the market’s price system that can 
capture tacit and dispersed knowledge in dynamic environments and allow for effective resource 
allocation and coordination of the process of production to achieve competitive advantage. 
According to Hayek (1945, p.521), this substitute must “convey to the individuals such additional 
knowledge as they need in order to enable them to fit their plans in with those of others… [such 
that] fuller use will be made of the existing knowledge.” It consists essentially of rules (Hayek, 
1982, pp. 49-50). 
Eisenhardt and Sull (2001, p.109) refer to this substitute, in organizations, as “a small 
number of strategically significant processes and … a few simple rules.” Eisenhardt and Sull (2001) 
identify five types of such rules: how-to, boundary, priority, timing, and exit.12 These strategic rules 
are in fact complementary to the resource allocation decisions made through entrepreneurial 
judgment in an organization. That is, entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial top-management make 
judgments over how to best allocate resources to make a profit given the uncertainty of the future 
that pervades the external environment in which the organisation operates. Within the parameters 
defined by these overall resource allocation decisions—what Foss and Klein (2012, p.188) call 
“original judgment”—other actors in the organisation (with dispersed knowledge and decision-
                                                          
12 How-to rules “spell out key features of how a process is executed”; Boundary rules “focus managers on which 
opportunities can be pursued and which are outside the pale”; Priority rules “help managers rank the accepted 
priorities”; Timing rules “synchronize managers with the pace of emerging opportunities and other parts of the 
company”; Exit rules “help managers decide when to pull out of yesterday’s opportunities” (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001, 
p.111). 





making) are able to make further decisions as to the precise employment of those resources in 
particular uses at lower levels. Rules allow for the tacit, dispersed knowledge and decision-making 
in an organisation to be integrated into an overall strategy for the organisation through a non-
formalized process. Simple rules “make sense for all kinds of companies—large and small, old and 
young—in fast-moving markets like those in the new economy... [whose] most profound strategic 
implication is that companies must capture unanticipated, fleeting opportunities in order to succeed” 
(Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001, p.108). Nevertheless, a Mintzberg-Hayek framework expands upon 
Eisenhardt and Hull’s restricted approach to strategy-as-rules as (mostly) being applicable to 
“rapidly changing, ambiguous markets.” As we have seen, Hayek contends that virtually all markets 
are uncertain as far as strategic planning is concerned, thereby playing up uncertainty and ambiguity 
for all firms, not just those in the most rapidly developing industries. Furthermore, tacit and 
dispersed knowledge exist in firms of all types, regardless of how rapidly markets might be 
changing. Strategy rules that undergird the decentralization of the strategy-making process are 
therefore required more universally than either Mintzberg or Eisenhardt and Sull recognized. 
According to Hayek (1994, p.80), rules “make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how 
the authority will use its powers in given circumstances and to plan... on the basis of this 
knowledge.” Thus, in all markets and in all organizations, big or small, rules can be the conditions 
that give the best scope to individual knowledge and initiative striving to coalesce into a strategic 
plan for the organization as a whole (Hayek, 1982, pp. 48-50).  
Overall, at the level of the organisation, a strategy is thus created—or rather, emerges—
through the implementation of localized strategic decisions following the general rules set out by 
top management. This learning process, which integrates the dispersed knowledge within the 
organisation, creates the strategic direction to a large extent from the bottom up rather than from the 
top down, but of course steered by the general rules defined by top management (see also Barney et 





al., 2018). It allows strategy to be informed by the organization at the same time as strategy informs 
and guides the organization. More interestingly, as Eisenhardt and Sull (2001) explain, this process 
of strategy-as-rules creation is not the result of “clever thinking,” that is, not the result of planning, 
but “of experience, especially mistakes,” that is, of learning. This resonates again with Mintzberg 
and Hayek’s view that a process of trial and error is implied in the strategic process, that is, strategic 
rules do not exist “out there” to be discovered, but are created through action in the marketplace and 
in the organization. Hayek and Mintzberg add to strategy-as-rules, however, by showing that from 
learning must arise a decentralized decision-making framework for the guided evolution of the firm.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning how this dispersed knowledge can be stored and coordinated. 
Routines and capabilities are firm-specific patterns of coordinated action that can store and 
coordinate (largely tacit) knowledge (a view originally articulated by Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Furthermore, this coordination system must allow for the organization to learn through 
implementation. Implementation and thinking are intertwined, and Mintzberg explains that 
organizations learn by doing and implementing strategy, rather than dichotomously thinking and 
implementing in two discreet processes.  
In this view, strategy thus provides a “competitive constitution,” a mechanism for 
coordination, rather than specific strategic actions (Foss & Klein, 2014, pp.15-16). It must be 
informed by the organization at the same time as it informs and guides the organization. In a 
pertinent discussion, Lachmann (1971, p.81) points out that:  
In a society in which it is generally known that frequent change of undesigned institutions 
is inevitable, the designers of designed institutions may deliberately confine their activity 
to designing a framework which leaves room for a good deal of change... In such a society 
it might be said that the undesigned institutions which evolve gradually... accumulate in 
the interstices of the institutional order. The interstices have been planned, though the 
sediments accumulating in them have not and could not have been.  
 
Along similar lines, the “designers of designed strategy may deliberately confine their activity 
to designing a framework which leaves room for a good deal” of emergent strategy, that is, 





initiatives that respond to changes in the environment and reflect the use of local knowledge. 
However, there seems to be a paradox: How can such a framework be designed in the 
presence of dispersed knowledge (which means that employees know things the firm’s top-
management does not, and unanticipated change)? As Langlois (1986, p.182) argues (see also 
Langlois, 1995), most events have both foreseeable and unforeseeable aspects, or what he 
calls “typical” and “unique” features. Typical features are those environmental features that 
are relatively stable. The unique features are, well, unique. We can often anticipate and 
therefore plan for the typical features. However, the unique features can only be “filled in” 
when they emerge.  
This basic idea is well-known in those parts of the economics of the firm that are 
based on incomplete contracting, informing Coase’s (1937) and Simon’s (1951) view of the 
employment contract (employers direct employees when the unique features of events 
materialize), Williamson’s (1996) view of governance structure (these are chosen to safeguard 
against “typical” instances of opportunism), and Kreps’ (1990) theory of corporate culture. 
Firms may indeed achieve internal plan consistency, as Malmgren (1961) argued, drawing on 
Hayek (1937), but only relating to the typical features of events (see also O’Driscoll & Rizzo, 
1985).  
As an example, consider the all-too-real case of demand or supply shocks due to a 
pandemic. These events are individually unpredictable, and cannot be completely accounted 
(or contracted) for in advance. Yet a framework of rules can be established within individual 
firms that guide behaviour in response to these types of events, if and when they occur. 
Eisenhardt and Sull (2012), for instance, mention the importance of rules about minimizing 
up-front expenditures and reusing existing resources, both of which are relevant in the 
pandemic scenario: both provide a simple framework within which employees can act 





according to clear guidelines and toward established goals. Furthermore, rules like this allow 
employees “on the ground” to exploit local or tacit knowledge. In the case of rules about 
reusing resources, this might include knowledge about discarded or unused machinery or 
equipment no longer on the company’s books that can be repaired or repurposed when a 
pandemic makes buying new machinery impossible. 
In sum, from a combined Hayek-Mintzberg perspective, the role of top management in 
all organisations, regardless of size or how fast the environment changes, is to supply schemes 
or “rules” that are flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen events, and that help agents 
coordinate their interdependent activities. To quote Lachmann (1971, p.13) again:  
[T]he central problem of the institutional order hinges on the contrast between coherence 
and flexibility, between the necessarily durable nature of the institutional order as a whole 
and the requisite flexibility of the individual institution ... the relative immutability of 
some institutions is always a necessary prerequisite for the relative flexibility of the rest.  
 
In sum, rules allow an organisation to integrate essential tacit knowledge and inform strategy 
process and content. The role of top management is then not only the creation or discovery of 
these rules, but the decision between how much of this knowledge to integrate and how much 
adaptation to preserve in the face of unforeseen contingencies. This may be seen as a 
knowledge-based variation of the familiar exploitation/exploration trade-off (March, 1991). 
However, while the latter indeed involves (more or less distant) learning, knowledge 
considerations are usually reserved for the exploration part. Hayek and Mintzberg add that 
exploiting existing knowledge is an independent challenge. Whereas Mintzberg’s main 
concern is learning, Hayek’s (1982) social philosophy emphasizes the simultaneous 
challenges of making the best possible use of existing knowledge, adaptation, and social 
learning.  
Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution predicts that those societies that have discovered 
and preserved social rules that encapsulate experiential knowledge that brings adaptation in 





the context of a dynamic environment and the division of knowledge will prosper relative to 
other societies. Moved down to the firm-level, this explains the importance of such rules for 
organizational success in dynamic, uncertain environments. Effectively dealing with the 
trade-off above can in fact become a source of value-creation; efficient rules that exploit the 
tacit knowledge in an organisation while preserving adaptation can be seen as a distinctive 
capability (of the managerial or entrepreneurial kind). Rules are complex, social, 
organisational phenomena, and because they involve a large degree of learning by doing, they 
are not subject to direct management and planning themselves, and thus not subject to 
imitation by other organisations.  
Successful rules can be without strategic equivalents in other organisations. This is 
due to two layers of uniqueness: first, dispersed, tacit knowledge is to a large degree bespoke 
and unique to each organisation, and by definition non-transferable. Second, the exploitation 
of this knowledge through rules, and the balance of integration and adaptation can be more or 
less efficiently or completely done. The distinct capability of top management to develop and 
use these rules, combined with particular relationships, routines, and cultures existing in an 
organisation that contextualize them may put—at least for some time—this socially complex 
resource beyond the scope of duplication or substitution by rival firms.  
The distinct rules-based view of strategy that emerges from combining Hayek and 
Mintzberg’s critiques of excessive rationalism in planning and strategy is in fact stronger than 
the sum of its parts, and wider-reaching that the original scope of either Mintzberg’s view or 
the strategy-as-rules framework. Hayek’s role in this, as we have tried to show, is in offering a 
more all-encompassing theoretical foundation that illuminates the social complexity 
surrounding the strategy process. This can offer a blueprint for, or at least an appreciation of 
the necessity of, rules for organisational success and value-creation.  






F.A. Hayek and Henry Mintzberg are towering individuals in their respective fields. Despite their 
different backgrounds and holding very different views in some respects (most obviously political), 
they nevertheless developed critiques of rationalist planning that are remarkably similar. In this 
essay we have compared their views across a number of topics, especially regarding the tensions in 
strategy research between thinking vs. learning, concentration vs. dispersion, formulation vs. 
implementation, and structure vs. strategy. Hayek’s critique of “constructivist rationalism” in 
politics, economics, and political philosophy is mirrored in Mintzberg’s critique of the rationalist 
planning ideal in strategy, as prominently instantiated in his debate with Ansoff.  
While conducted at different levels of analysis and for different purposes, Hayek and 
Mintzberg’s views help stress the underlying problems with top-down, centralized strategy 
formation independent of learning. Furthermore, Hayek extends Mintzberg’s approach by showing 
how rules in the firm capture adaptive, experiential, tacit, and dispersed knowledge in the context of 
dynamic environments. This in turn increases the scope for strategy-as-rules, which had before been 
mainly confined to rapidly changing environments. A framework of rules creates inimitable and 
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